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In this thesis, we examine firms’ choice of price policy, uniform or personalized prices, in
the digital economy. We focus on firms operating in the digital economy as the prevalence
of big data allows firms in this industry the opportunity to apply personalized pricing. We
survey relevant literature on product differentiation, two-sided markets and first-degree
price discrimination in spatial models. Further, we propose a Hotelling model of a two-
sided market consisting of symmetric firms, consumers and advertisers. The firms choose
their pricing policies, invest in product quality and set the prices in the advertiser and
consumer market. To our knowledge, the model is the first of its kind to combine the
choice of price policy, the presence of a two-sided market and quality investments in the
same framework. We present two versions of the model, a one-sided duopoly model and
a two-sided duopoly model. In the one-sided model we find that the firms will always
choose to price discriminate as it constitutes a dominant strategy, complementing the
early literature on the field. In contrast, we show that in the two-sided model with an
adequately large advertiser market, the optimal price policy strategy is characterized by
a mixed strategy. Thus, the firms will not always choose to price discriminate with the
introduction of an advertiser market. For the firms, a large advertisement market drives
costly quality investments. This has implications on the choice of price policy as pricing
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Introduction 1
1 Introduction
Before the 1860s, prices of goods and services in the retail sector in the Unites States and
Western Europe were typically set through interaction between an individual seller and
an individual buyer (Phillips, 2012). For instance, when a potential customer entered
a clothing store looking for a new coat, the salesperson would attempt to assess the
customer’s willingness to pay for the coat, before offering the customer a price for the
coat. If the salesperson noticed that the customer wore expensive clothing items, the
salesperson might presume that the customer was willing to pay a higher price for the
coat. The salesperson would also try to figure out whether the customer was in a hurry or
willing to stay and negotiate the price.
This type of price setting can be described as a form of price discrimination, namely
personalized pricing: offering an individual price to each customer. The downfall of
this type of price setting was that in the case of large numbers of customers, it was
inefficient for the stores to spend time negotiating and gathering information about each
individual’s reservation price (Phillips, 2012). However, around this time we saw the
introduction of departments stores and price tags. These innovations normalized uniform
prices, alleviating the retailers from the inefficient price setting process of personalized
prices.
Today, personalized pricing is becoming relevant again. This happens as our everyday
lives are becoming increasingly digitalized. Through the internet and other technological
solutions, we leave digital traces that allow firms to collect information about us. People
generate data all day long. After the alarm goes off in the morning, we typically check
our phones, scrolling through various social networks and websites. Instead of reading
the newspaper about yesterday’s news in hard copy, we often prefer to read today’s news
online. On our way to work, firms can track the music we listen to and the ticket for
public transportation is commonly registered through a mobile app. Furthermore, firms
are able to track our location through mapping software. At home, some people habitually
order food from Foodora, and eat the meal while watching the latest show on Netflix.
Additionally, in recent years, online shopping has become increasingly frequent, enabling
firms to track our retail purchase history. By means of all of these generated data, firms
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are able to track and collect unfathomable amounts of data on an individual level (White
House, 2015).
All this data creates large, varied and complex data sets, typically referred to as "big data"
(Sagiroglu and Sinanc, 2013). Big data and machine learning algorithms have lowered the
firms’ cost of collecting and analysing data about their customers’ behavior. Through
the use of big data, the digital economy provides information on consumer preferences,
thereby enabling targeting of pricing, marketing and product characteristics to individual
consumers unlike seen before (Choe et al., 2018). Particularly relevant to our paper, the
firms may use this data to estimate individuals’ willingness to pay for a product (Choe
et al., 2018). What once was a slow dance between a salesperson and a customer in
clothing shops in the early nineteenth century, has in the digital economy become a highly
efficient and scalable process. Furthermore, before the advent of big data, firms could
possibly need to wait months before they could analyze the data, which made predictions
on sales in near future impossible. Now, the volume, speed and the variety of the data
allow the firms to analyze data in real time, granting high precision and adaptability to
predict consumer and market characteristics.
There are both empirical and theoretical examples of possible applications of big data and
its advantages. A real-life example is the Netflix show "House of Cards". The successful
show was created based on analyses of big data on consumer preferences. The show is
a result of combining the preferences for the actor Kevin Spacey, the producer David
Fincher and the previous BBC show "House of Cards" (Erevelles et al., 2016). Shiller
(2013) offers a more theoretical approach. He uses consumer data from 2006, including
almost 5000 potential website browsing explanatory variables, to examine if consumer
data can be used to raise firms’ profits. Shiller (2013) concludes that Netflix’s profits can
be increased by 12.2 percent by using website browsing behaviors for personalized pricing.
In contrast, the paper estimates that Netflix can raise their profits only by 0.8 percent if
they use demographics to price discriminate the consumers.
To recapitulate, we have a newfound relevance of personalized pricing due to big data.
Intriguingly, even though firms have obtained these advanced ways to offer personalized
prices, consumers still experience personalized pricing to a relatively limited degree in
the digital economy. We will survey existing economic literature, which offers insights to
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why this is the case. Generally, the economic literature looks at the firms’ incentives to
offer personalized prices under different competitive settings, as well how these incentives
change with different extensions.
We contribute to the literature by presenting a duopoly location model using the traditional
spatial model with linear transportation costs as proposed by Hotelling (1929). The model
consists of consumers, firms and advertisers; thereby, it also includes the element of
two-sided markets.1 Furthermore, we model that the firms have the ability to invest in
product quality, and to choose whether to price discriminate or to have uniform prices in
the consumer market.
We find it suitable to include two-sidedness in the model when studying price discrimination
in the digital economy, as firms operating in the digital economy often are characterized
by their capability to connect users and advertisers. Moreover, with the introduction of
two-sided markets, we may get contrasting pricing implications compared to when simply
considering a one-sided market. Examples of two-sidedness in the digital economy include
online newspapers, who typically earn revenue from both readers and advertisers, social
media such as Facebook and search engines such as Google. In addition, the e-commerce
part of the company Amazon is increasingly dependent on advertisement revenue (Perrin,
2018). In fact, Amazon might be the most relevant real-life case to our model as it
has a business model that easily allows for either uniform prices or personalized pricing.
However, it is debatable whether or not the e-commerce part of Amazon is operating in a
duopoly or if it is a monopoly.
We analyse two iterations of our model. In the first iteration, we disregard the advertiser
market, thereby examining a one-sided model. In the second iteration, we include the
advertiser market, enabling us to compare the results with and without two-sidedness.
Thus, the question arises: how will the introduction of a two-sided market affect the firms’
decision of pricing policy when the firms have the ability to invest in quality?
Our thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2, we offer an overview of the existing
economic literature on product differentiation, price discrimination and two-sided markets.
In chapter 3, we present a duopoly location model. In chapter 4, the equilibria are derived
1
A possible definition of a two-sided market is that the firms connect at least two distinct groups of
users, the consumer market and the advertiser market. Additionally, at least one of the groups exhibits
network effects on the other. More on this is in section 2.3 Two-sided markets.
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and analysed. Chapter 5 discusses the results and chapter 6 concludes.
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2 Literature review
We begin the literature review by giving a brief introduction of firms’ price setting.
Secondly, we investigate oligopoly price competition and product differentiation in section
2.2. In that section we also present a basic Hotelling model which we will later expand on.
Thereafter, we complement this exploration by reviewing the relatively new theoretical
field of two-sided markets. Finally, we look specifically at first-degree price discrimination
in a monopoly and a duopoly situations. We expand on the review of first-degree price
discrimination in a duopoly situation by examining different aspects to consider when
studying this type of competition. The literature review also relates to the later chapters,
as our model is based upon several of the elements presented in this chapter. Also, it
provides a theoretical foundation to discuss our own model and its contribution to the
literature.
2.1 Price setting
Any given firm will strive towards a pricing policy that maximizes its profits.2 A pricing
policy is a firm’s method of setting a price on its products based on market characteristics.
A firm operating in a market with perfect competition does not have any market power
and in the long run it faces a market price equal to its marginal cost of producing the
good. On the contrary, a firm having market power is able to influence its own price or
its quantity produced, not taking them as given (see e.g. Franck and Peitz, 2019).
Economic theory usually divides firms with market power into three main forms of market
structures: monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. A monopolist operates in
a market absent of any actual or potential competitors. The two other market structures
are seen as less extreme, with characteristics from both perfect competition and monopoly.
If we depart from the market characteristics and look at price setting specifically, a natural
division of pricing policies is uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing. Uniform pricing
is as the phrase suggests: a policy of pricing the provided good at the same price for
every buyer. The theoretically optimal way to price uniformly is to produce the quantity
2
It is possible to argue that the managers of firms might have other objectives. Nonetheless, this
is a premise is made by most economic theory. For a further discussion see The Theory of Industrial
Organization (Tirole, 1988).
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where the firm’s marginal cost equals its marginal revenue and charging the corresponding
price.3 In contrast to uniform pricing, price discrimination is when the same product is
sold by a firm at different prices. Formally defined by Stigler (1987) as "... when two
or more similar goods are sold at prices that are in different ratios to marginal costs"
(Varian, 1989, p. 598). A firm must have market power to be able to price discriminate.
A firm without market power is a price-taker, rather than a price-setter, and therefore
price discrimination will not be an option anyway.
If a firm chooses to price discriminate, the firm may earn a greater profit than a firm with
uniform prices. This is possible by charging a higher price for consumers that have the
highest willingness to pay (WTP). The outcome of price discrimination differs depending
on what kind of market structure the firm operates in. In some cases, price discrimination
leads to a higher producer surplus. While in other cases, price discrimination leads to a
higher consumer surplus. The coming sections of the literature review will look further
into this.
In standard economic theory, if a firm has market power and prices uniformly, the firm must
take several considerations into account when setting a price with the aim of maximizing
profits. In the most simplistic approach, a higher price yields a higher revenue from
each consumer, while it will also scare away some consumers. Conversely, a lower price
will attract more consumers while yielding lower revenue per consumer. In the case of
personalized pricing, these mechanics cease to exist. One is no longer interested to see how
a given price affects the total demand of the good, as the price is tailored to the specific
individual’s willingness to pay. The price offered to one individual does not affect the price
given to another individual, which will further affect the price setting and competition
between firms as we will see later.
A requirement for a successful price discrimination, is that the firm must prevent resale
(Varian, 1989). If a consumer can buy the product at one price and then resale the same
product to another consumer at a higher price, the price discriminatory policy will not
work. The low-price consumer will earn profit from resale, and the high-price consumer
can buy the product at a lower price than from the firm directly. Further requirements for
3
If the firms operate in a two-sided market they would need to correct the marginal revenue for the
existence of cross-group network externalities. The concept of cross-group network externalities will be
looked into in section 2.3 Two-sided markets.
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price discrimination are that the firm needs different customers with different willingness
to pay, and a way to identify these differences or to make them self-select into different
groups. The firm will not be able to charge different prices if all the customers have the
same price sensitivity of demand.
Price discrimination is seen in different forms. Economic theory commonly classify price
discrimination into three categories, following the traditional classification of Pigou (1920):
first-degree, second-degree, and third-degree price discrimination (Varian, 1989).
First-degree price discrimination occurs when each consumer receives an individual price,
also called personalized prizing.4 In most instances, it is naturally difficult for a firm to
identify every single consumer’s willingness to pay. Due to the impracticality of first-degree
price discrimination in most markets, at least before the arrival of big data, the two other
types have been by far most prevalent. Nonetheless, personalized pricing has been seen to
some extent in industries such as hotel and airline agencies (Mohammed, 2017). Further,
the e-commerce part of Amazon is suggested to previously having experimented with
personalized pricing (Wallheimer, 2016).
The firms also have the option to offer slightly different products at different prices, which
often is easier than identifying a single consumer’s reservation price. This differentiation
between the products can be found in both quality and quantity. This is described as
second-degree price discrimination. Digital companies, such as the music streaming service
Spotify and the online video platform YouTube, use pricing policies such as the freemium
model, which is a form of second-degree price discrimination (Sato, 2019). The freemium
model is based on offering different versions of the product, one ad-based, free version
and an ad-free, higher quality, subscription version of the product.
The last category of price discrimination is characterized by offering a different price
for the same product to different consumer groups, which is called third-degree price
discrimination. An example of third-degree price discrimination is to divide the consumers
into different age groups and offer different prices to the different groups (Armstrong,
4
There is a distinction between the terms first-degree price discrimination and personalized pricing.
First-degree price discrimination refers to charging the consumers their full reservation value, while
personalized pricing involves charging the consumers different prices, however not necessarily the full
reservation price (Shiller, 2013). We have used the term personalized pricing upon till now, as it is
more precise. Practically, it is far-fetched to consider situations in which the consumers’ full reservation
prices are identifiable. However, for theoretical purposes, first-degree price discrimination is often a more
suitable term. We will use the terms interchangeably throughout the rest of this paper.
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2008). For instance, Spotify make use of third-degree price discrimination by offering
students a lower price. In some ways first-degree and third-degree price discrimination
are becoming more indistinguishable (Varian, 2018). New technology enables digital
companies to personalize the user-products. Following the example of Spotify, they would
no longer have to settle for a discriminatory practice between students and other listeners.
They can, in theory, tailor the product to each listener.
The firm’s decision of which type of price discrimination to implement depends on the
type of information the firm has access to. If the firm has sufficient information about
each customer’s demand curves before the transaction, the firm can charge each customer
a personalized price. If the firm can identify the demand of different customers groups, it
can practice third-degree discrimination. When the firm cannot differ between the types
of consumers before the purchase, the firm can offer different pricing packages and the
customers will self-select into their own preferred option. The last example mentioned
will be second-degree price discrimination through offering different packages containing
quantity discount and different versions of the product.
2.2 Product differentiation
In between the two extremes of perfect competition and a monopoly market lies oligopoly
competition. Oligopoly competition is composed of competition among a few firms with
some degree of market power. Whereas the economic theory regarding the two extremes can
be described to be more general and absolute, the theory of how industries are organized
is more complex, and the theoretical modelling needs to be fitted to the characteristics of
a specific industry. A classic disjunction in industrial economics is made between price
competition and quantum competition, drawing on the influential works of economists
Joseph Bertrand and Antoine Cournot respectively. The difference between the two types
of competition regards the firms’ choice variable: whether they set and compete in prices
or quanta.
Assuming homogeneous products, the consumers will always buy the cheapest product.
Therefore, Bertrand competition leads to the famous result that firms will undercut each
other’s prices until they reach their marginal costs and there are no profits left, given that
their marginal costs are equal. This result has been named the Bertrand paradox as the
Literature review 9
high market concentration and seemingly weak competition can become extremely intense
and the firms compete away super-normal profits with the addition of only one rival from
the monopoly situation. Given the unfortunate nature of this type of competition the
firms are eager to seek away from this situation.
Chamberlin (1933) argues that firms in monopolistic competition can have market power as
long as the firms do not have homogeneous products. Thus, firms can avoid the Bertrand
paradox by offering differing product characteristics, namely product differentiation.
Lancaster (1979) defines two types of differentiation: vertical- and horizontal differentiation.
Vertical differentiation is when the goods have different quality and every single consumer
would prefer one good over the other good if they were sold at the same price. That is to
say the product is objectively better. On the other hand, horizontal differentiation refers
to a differentiation between goods where consumers cannot agree which good they would
prefer at equal prices. In this case the firms differentiate their products to appeal to the
consumers’ subjective preferences.
2.2.1 Hotelling’s linear city
Harold Hotelling (1929) conceptualizes the idea of horizontal differentiation using a spatial
model. His model, often referred to as Hotelling’s linear city, consists of two firms (firm 1
and 2) competing for consumers uniformly distributed along a line. We will consider a
line normalized to have length 1. The distribution of consumers along this line represents
their heterogeneity in preferences. The firms’ locations on this line characterize their
degree of product differentiation. Given that firm 1 is located (weakly) to the left of firm
2, we denote their respective distance to the end points, 0 and 1, as a and b. Implying
that a, b   0 and 1  a  b   0. If they are located at the exact same spot along the line,
we have a = b = 12 and the products will consequently be homogeneous. Thus, we are










Figure 2.1: Hotelling’s linear city
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When deciding which product to buy, the consumers’ preferences will deviate from the
specifications of a firm’s product. The consumers experience a transportation cost which
can be deemed as the mismatch between the consumers’ preferences and the characteristics
of a firm’s product. The transportation cost is increasing in the difference between the
consumers’ preferences and the actual product characteristics. This is where spatial
models prove valuable. If the spatial model represents actual geographical space, naturally
you experience a higher transportation cost the further you travel. Obviously, you would
prefer buying the same bag of groceries for the same price at the supermarket closest to
you as you would find this less of a hassle. In the same way, deviating further away from
your preferred variety of a product would be costly.
The brief presentation above provides the foundation for the most basic version of the
model. The utility of buying from firm 1 is depicted by:
U1 = v   p1   t|a  x|
Correspondingly, the utility a consumer would get from buying from firm 2 would be:
U2 = v   p2   t|(1  b)  x|
Where v represents the consumer’s gross willingness to buy the product. pi is the price
paid to firm i (i = 1, 2). The transportation costs of travelling to, meaning purchasing,
from either firm 1 or 2, are t|a x| or t|(1 b) x| respectively. The consumer will purchase
from the firm providing him/her the highest utility. In this case, this will be equivalent
to the lowest generalized cost. Figure 2.1 above also depicts the indifferent consumer, x̃,
who obtains the same level of utility from buying from each firm. Mathematically, the
indifferent consumer can be found by setting U1 = U2 and solving for x. Consequently, the
area spanning from the indifferent consumer to each side of the line represents each firm’s
demand. The demand for firm 1 will then be x̃ and (1  x̃) is the demand for firm 2.5
Formally, the demand functions can be written as:
5
We assume that consumers are single-homing, meaning that they buy one, and only one, unit of the
good.
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The firms maximize the following profit functions:6
⇡i = xi(pi, pj) · (pi   c)
By differentiating the profit function with respect to prices and utilizing the expressions












t(1 + b  a)
2







We obtain the result that a firm has incentives to localize inwards in the line. This result
arises because of Hotelling’s assumption of a linear transportation cost, each firm will
earn a marginally larger market share if they move towards the middle of the line. As a
result of the model, both firms would locate in the middle of the line next to each other.
This is the reasoning for the principle of minimum differentiation.
The observant reader would notice that the principle of minimum differentiation pushes
the firms back to the Bertrand paradox, creating a stability issue for this equilibrium,
which is pointed out by the influential work of d’Aspremont et al. (1979). They show that
6c stands for the firms’ marginal cost, whereby we assume c1 = c2 = c.
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two conflicting effects are influential in the firms’ price setting. On the one hand, the
firms will try to differentiate as little as possible as that gives the largest possible market
size, however they will also want to push toward differentiation as that enables them to






Figure 2.2: The direct effect versus the strategic effect
D’Aspremont et al. (1979) demonstrate that if the linear transportation costs are
substituted with quadratic transportation costs, the firms will now locate at each end
of the line.7 This originates the principle of maximum product differentiation. In this
scenario the strategic effect dominates the direct effect.
The findings of d’Aspremont et al. were later confirmed by Economides (1986). However,
he points out that the specific degree of differentiation found by d’Aspremont et al. only
holds for quadratic forms of the utility function, and therefore, the principle of maximal
differentiation is not a general result. Rather, he shows that if one uses a less convex, but
not linear utility function (t(di) = t(1  a  b)↵ with 1 < ↵ < 2), the equilibrium outcome
is an interior location on the line.
This illustrates the importance of the parameter t, which in the digital economy can be
said to model the consumer’s choosiness or loyalty for a specific brand. In models of spatial
differentiation, the consumer’s preference, or more precisely disutility of deviating from
its preference, is what allows the firms to escape the Bertrand paradox. The larger the
t(di), the more it costs the consumer in terms of utility loss to deviate from its preference,
and the larger market power the firm has over its consumers.
2.3 Two-sided markets
A defining feature of many digital companies is that they can be characterized as two-sided
markets. A two-sided market can be described as a market (i.e. a platform) that connects
7
In fact, they show that the firms will prefer to locate outside the line at a = b =  1/4 if allowed for.
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at least two distinct groups of users, where at least one of the groups exhibit cross-group
network externalities (also referred to as cross-group network effects). This means the
group of users’ value of the platform is dependent on the number of users of the other
group. Following the phrasing of Evans (2003), the platform internalizes the externalities
between the different groups of users. Furthermore, for the market to be considered as
a two-sided market, the two different groups of users cannot be able to connect to each
other without the platform.
Although two-sided markets have existed in various forms throughout history, it was
only just after the last change of millennium that it emerged as a new theoretical field
in economics. One of the first articles on the field is the paper by Rochet and Tirole
(2003) regarding the economics of payment card associations. A credit card provider
is the intermediary between cardholders and the merchants who accept the card as
payment. Implying that we have two distinct user-groups, as well as they display network
externalities from one side to the other side, consumers will want to carry cards that
are accepted by as many merchants as possible and merchants will seek to offer the
predominant payment solution among the consumers. Lastly, following the definition, the
cards offered by companies such as Visa and MasterCard, operate as matchmakers and
internalize these externalities. Sun and Tse (2007) provide a further specification of the
role of the different agents in two-sided markets. In their terminology, it would be more
precise to denote Visa and MasterCard as distributors of a network. The distributors
produce and sell network-specific products to network participants. Sun and Tse (2007)
call the group operating the network for the platform sponsor, which in the case of payment
card networks, would be the banks issuing the cards. In many two-sided markets, the role
of the distributor is absent, as the network platform sponsor takes on this role by itself.
Subsequent to the birth of the theory, Evans and Schmalensee (2005) provides a
categorization of different types of two-sided markets: These are exchanges (platforms
facilitating between what we typically think of as buyers and sellers), advertiser-supported
media (traditionally media such as newspapers and free television, and now increasingly
digital platforms), transaction devices (such as described with payment card associations),
and software platforms (for instance video games platforms such as PlayStation and Xbox).
Judging based on the development of the literature, this categorization seems to still hold
Literature review 14
up well. However, the e-commerce part of Amazon, a traditional case of an exchange type
two-sided market, is now blurring the lines between the categories as advertising becomes
an increasingly bigger part of its business strategy. Even though Amazon’s marketplace
does not fall under the media category directly, the business model of Amazon today
shares many similarities with this field on the literature on two-sided markets.
A key element in the literature on media markets in relation to two-sidedness comes from
the interplay between the media consumers and the advertisers. Here, negative cross-group
externalities might be present. The literature on the field is ambiguous regarding whether
advertisements are increasing or decreasing the consumer utility of using a platform.
Naturally, advertisers experience positive network externalities from consumers; however,
consumers may experience negative network externalities from advertisers since consumers
may dislike advertisements. Papers such as Kind et al. (2009) model this as a nuisance
cost of advertisement for the consumers. This leads to asymmetric network externalities
and have pricing implications in two-sided markets.
From a theoretical perspective, there is a common distinction in economic theory between
informative and persuasive advertising. To some degree, all advertising can be said to
have both an informative and persuasive character. Although, the motive and the degree
of persuasiveness in advertising is different (Kaldor, 1950). Given that consumers have
perfect information about the product, Kaldor argues that advertising may be socially
bad. However, informative advertisement may provide information about a product’s
quality and may therefore have a positive contribution to a consumer’s utility. On the
other hand, persuasive advertisements are often seen as less appreciated by readers.
The sign of the externality has also been empirically studied. Kaiser and Song (2009) test
if media consumers dislike advertising by using data from German consumer magazines.
Their study found little evidence that readers of the magazines dislike advertisement. In
addition, Kaiser and Song show that consumers appear to like advertising to a higher
degree the more informative it is. Wilbur (2008) studies a two-sided, empirical model of
television advertising. Wilbur finds empirical evidence for viewers to have an inclination
to be averse to advertising. He estimates that a decrease of 10 percent in advertising level
will result in a 25 percent increase of audience size.
As we can see, the literature on advertising in markets with network externalities is
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ambiguous with respect to advertisement’s effect on consumer utility, and is likely
dependent on its type, the setting and individual preferences. Related to the case of the
e-commerce platform Amazon, the advertising on this platform have both informative
and persuasive elements to it. Amazon can provide targeted and rather informative
advertisement based on your purchasing history. However, if you search for headphones of
a specific brand and must toggle through numerous unknown “knock-off” brands, that
might be seen as an inconvenience. Becker and Murphy (1993) argue that utility-decreasing
advertisements are less likely to be placed in newspapers and magazines because readers
can easily ignore advertisements in this type of media.
Naturally, advertisers want to reach out to as many potential customers as possible,
however we have seen that the media consumers do not necessarily reciprocate this
sentiment. This imposes consequences as to how the platform should construct its pricing
structure. They need to balance the advertisers’ need for consumers with the consumer’s
potential distaste of advertising. Armstrong (2006a) summarizes the pricing structure in
two-sided markets and states that it will depend on three factors:
1) The relative size of the cross-group externality
Armstrong (2006a) expands on this by stating that “If a member of group 1 exerts a large
positive externality on each member of group 2, then group 1 will be targeted aggressively
by platforms” (p. 668). Aggressive targeting can be thought of as a downward pressure on
prices compared to what would have been the case with no network externalities. In fact,
one might end up in a situation where the one side is so heavily subsidized that prices
fall below marginal cost to zero or even negative prices. This is seen in many of today’s
business models for digital platforms. In a United States congressional hearing, Facebook’s
CEO Mark Zuckerberg, famously answered “Senator, we run ads”, to the question on how
they sustain a business model in which users do not pay for Facebook’s services (The
Washington Post, 2018). This is in line with the point Armstrong is making: subsidize
the users as they exert relatively large externalities on the advertisers.
2) Fixed fees or per-transaction charges
This factor is regarding the pricing scheme itself, and is related to Rochet and Tirole’s
(2003) distinction between subscription fees (synonymous with fixed fees) and transaction
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fees. A platform will choose the pricing schemes which suits them best. It might even
apply different schemes to different user-groups, as well as allowing users in a group to
opt for the preferred scheme.
The essential difference between the pricing schemes is how they affect the cross-group
externalities. Armstrong (2006a) states that cross-group externalities are weaker with
per-transaction based pricing, the reason being that a part of the marginal benefit of
interacting with an extra agent on the other side is eroded by the extra payment incurred.
In other words, when an agent only pays the platform per successful interaction, it is not
equally important for the agent that the platform first has gotten the other side “on board”.
The consequence is that the platform profits might be higher under per-transaction charges
due to weaker externalities. As we have seen intuitively, the platform profits are highly
dependent upon the externalities between the groups.
3) Single- or multi-homing
In the presentation of the Hotelling model, we assume that the consumers are single-
homing, meaning that they only buy one good. However, opening for users to buy from
several platforms, will impact the outcome. Generally speaking, there are three cases to
consider: either both user-groups single-home, one single-homes and the other multi-homes,
or lastly, both multi-home.
Armstrong (2006a) shows that single-homing consumers in two-sided markets lead to
the concept of “competitive bottlenecks”. That is, in the case of digital platforms, if an
advertiser wants to reach out to a user of a digital platform, the advertiser must deal with
that specific user’s choice of platform. The advertiser has no other way of reaching that
user. In turn, this gives the platform monopoly power over access to this user. Naturally,
this will lead to higher prices being charged to the multi-homing side, and aggressive
competition for the single-homing users in the first place. Furthermore, the high profits
from the advertiser side may be passed on to the consumer in form of low prices. Empirical
studies have found evidence of this in form of subsidization of the readership side in the
market for magazines (e.g. Kaiser and Wright, 2006).
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2.4 First-degree price discrimination
The literature survey of Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination,
by Armstrong (2006b), states that the nature and effects of price discrimination are
crucially dependent upon which kind of information that is available for the firm. In fact,
some information will cause the firm to make higher profits, and some may lower the
prices, which favors the consumers. “Information” can be thought of as which variable
of the consumers’ utility function the firm can discriminate over. The literature mainly
considers types of information such as information of the consumers’ valuation v, their
choosiness/loyalty t or their location/brand preference x.
It is possible to show that, if the firm has perfect information over consumers’ valuation v,
price discrimination on this variable will not affect the equilibrium price at all (Armstrong,
2006b). Price discrimination on the choosiness variable t differs from what we get with
v. Equilibrium prices are in duopoly frameworks typically dependent on t, and it can be
seen that this type of price discriminatory practice can both increase and decrease prices
dependent on other factors. However, we will focus on situations in which the firms can
price discriminate on the consumers’ location/brand preference x, which has been the
predominant focus in the literature on the field.
2.4.1 First-degree price discrimination in a monopoly
A monopoly who is able to first-degree price discriminate (FDPD) will charge each
consumer exactly its willingness to pay. Thereby, the monopolist will extract all the
surplus from the trade and the consumers are left with nothing (Armstrong, 2006b). This
holds as long as the consumer’s WTP is above the firm’s marginal cost of producing the
product. In contrast to uniform prices, the market is efficient when a monopoly practices
FDPD. The quantity sold is the same as in a perfectly competitive market, therefore no
potential economic surplus is lost from a reduction in quantity. Although the deadweight












Figure 2.3: First-degree price discrimination in a monopoly
The result heavily relies on the premise of a monopoly situation. As we will see, the
outcome changes considerably if we introduce rivaling firms.
2.4.2 First-degree price discrimination in a duopoly
A seminal paper on first-degree price discrimination in a competitive setting is the paper
"On the Strategic Choice of Spatial Price Policy" by Thisse and Vives (1988). The
paper, which looks at a spatial competition situation, offers contrasting implications to
the scenario presented with FDPD in the monopoly situation. Thisse and Vives study
the firms’ incentives to price discriminate among their consumers, rather than offering a
uniform price. In addition, they look at the implication of the price policy on consumer
surplus and firm profits.
Thisse and Vives consider two separate cases, either the firms choose their price policy
simultaneously or the firms have the option to commit to a price strategy in advance
of the price competition. Regardless of what case they consider, they find a general
conclusion that “there is a robust tendency for firms to choose the discriminatory policy...”
(p. 134) over uniform pricing. This is analogous with FDPD in the monopoly situation;
however, the firms may be worse off from the discriminatory policy than what they would
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have been without the possibility to price discriminate. This seemingly counterintuitive
result stems from the fact that price discrimination creates a prisoner’s dilemma situation
whereby each firm would be better off unilaterally implementing personalized pricing,
despite the fact they would have been better off pricing uniformly collectively. We will
take a deeper look into the model to achieve an understanding of the firm’s incentives
and the implications on price setting.
We will initially present a simplified version of Thisse and Vives’ model, inspired by Foros
et al. (2017), thereafter complement the model with the more intuition-based analysis
from the original article. The Hotelling line is akin to what we already have presented
when looking at spatial competition. The firms are symmetric and thought to have perfect
information of the location of all consumers, which enable the firms to provide personalized
prices based on the location, x, instead of a uniform price. In the Thisse and Vives set-up,
the firms are exogenously located at each end of a Hotelling line. Using our original
Hotelling model, presented in section 2.2.1 Hotelling’s linear city, this implies that a, b = 0.
Hereby, we get the following demand functions:
x1(p1, p2) = x̃ =
1
2
  p1   p2
2t
x2(p1, p2) = 1  x̃ =
1
2
  p2   p1
2t
The firms profit functions are equivalent as before:
⇡i = xi(pi, pj) · (pi   c)
First, we look at the equilibrium price during uniform pricing. We get the equilibrium
price:
p⇤i = c+ t





We see that prices are monotonously increasing in the transportation cost. This means as
the consumers have higher preferences or loyalty for one of the firms, the consumers are
less price sensitive and the firms have more market power over their consumers.





Now, we will consider how first-degree price discrimination affect prices and profits in our
simplified version. When the firms are price discriminating, the consumers choose to buy
from the firm offering the lowest generalized price. The consumer located at point x will
buy from firm 1 if:
p1(x) + tx  p2(x) + t(1  x)
Contrary to the uniform price setting, the firms now offer a personalized price to each
and every consumer. The consumers are characterized by their location x. The firms will
offer lower prices to those consumers further away, as they have less market power over
them, and the rivalling firm can increasingly match their price. In the middle of the line,
none of the firms exhibit any locational advantages.
The firms will not in any scenario offer any less than their marginal cost, however they
will be willing to price as low as their marginal cost if that means they will attract that
consumer. In other words, the firms will always charge a price that reflects the firms’
incremental value of the consumer.
Below, we see a depiction of the equilibrium prices in figure 2.4.8
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium market price schedule




4 by price discriminating rather than pricing uniformly. For firm 1, the areas A and
B in the figure make up its profit when pricing uniformly, but when price discriminating,








Figure 2.5: Profits under uniform pricing and price discrimination
To see how the firms choose their pricing policies, we will turn over to the two cases
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presented in Thisse and Vives (1988), the simultaneous and the sequential cases. They
provide a more intuition-based understanding of the price setting.
In the case of simultaneous price setting, the paper provides a logical explanation as to
why it will always be in firm i’s interest to price discriminate given what the competing
firm does. They segment the Hotelling line by what type of price setting which will be
optimal for the firms at given locations.
In a segment of locations, firm i will charge the monopoly price, pMi (x), to the consumers
if they are able to. This segment of locations exist if pMi (x) does not exceed the total
marginal costs of the rival firm j. In this case, firm j cannot price under marginal cost
and firm i will price similarly as to what they would have without a competitor.
Another segment is characterized by one firm having a cost advantage over the other firm,
meaning the advantageous firm can charge the profit maximizing price given the rival’s
total marginal cost. The last segment of the line will be when the firm is in an inferior
position and will simply prize at its total marginal cost, denoted as mci(x).
For each segment of the line, the abovementioned pricing policy is the dominant policy.
The monopoly pricing will be the optimal pricing policy for the firm in the interval they
have the opportunity to do so. Thereafter, we define p̄i(x), as the optimal price given the
firms cost-advantage position. As for the last segment, the rival firm will in any case be
able to provide the best price for consumers and the firm will earn zero profits regardless.
As the different segments comprise the potential market area, Thisse and Vives show
intuitively that price discriminating will be the dominant strategy. No matter what the
rival does, the firm will always benefit from price discriminating rather than pricing





if firm i has a monopoly position at x
if firm i does not have monopoly position,
but it has a locational advantage
otherwise
The second case presented by Thisse and Vives (1988) is a two-period model where the
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firms in the first period have the possibility to commit themselves to a uniform price,
thereafter, compete in prices in the next period. A way to commit yourself to uniform
prices in the digital economy, would be to not collect data in the first period (Matsumura
and Matsushima, 2015). If you choose to not collect data about your users, you will not
be able to personalize the prices. Conversely, if a firm decides to collect data, one expects
it would be in the firm’s interest to capitalize on this one way or another. Data collection
in the digital economy often occurs through placing cookies onto the user’s computer.
The cookie stores information about the user’s behavior on the internet, and over time it
has the potential to build a long-term picture of the individuals Internet browsing history
(White House, 2015).
In this game, Thisse and Vives find that it is a dominant strategy to choose the unrestricted
price schedule at the first stage. However, as we have briefly touched upon, the game is
a prisoner’s dilemma in which both parties would be better off committing to uniform
prices. However, at the same time they will have incentives to deviate from this strategy.
We describe the unrestricted price schedule as “dominant” for this very reason, as the
firms by not committing to uniform prices would not regret their decision after learning
what the rivalling firm chose. It constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
To understand how the option to price discriminate creates this unfortunate situation for
the firms, we need to consider the nature of the competition during price discriminatory
practices. The essential difference we observe in how the firms compete under the two
price policies is that under uniform pricing the firms compete for the marginal consumer,
while that under personalized pricing the competitive field is broadened, and the firms
compete for each consumer individually. In the monopoly situation, price discrimination
served as a mean to extract the consumer surplus, whereas in the spatial context it is
more of a curse with intensified price competition. In fact, in the framework of Thisse and
Vives (1988), the two firms compete away their surplus and the consumers gain what the
firms loose. Accordingly, the total economic surplus is equal in both cases, and the pricing
policy simply affects the distribution of the surplus between the firms and the consumers.
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2.4.3 Uniform pricing puzzle
Given that price discrimination constitutes a dominant strategy, we would expect to
see more examples of this in the real world. It is suggested that price discrimination is
observed unproportionally less than expected in markets where firms can personalize their
prices. The rarity of price discrimination has originated the uniform pricing puzzle in the
academic literature.
For instance, DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) show that most U.S. retail chains choose
to price close to uniformly across stores, even though there is a wide variation in customer
demographics and competition. Another example of this is Richardson and Stähler (2016),
who consider the uniform pricing puzzle in the recorded music industry. The recorded
music industry, and specifically the sale of CDs, is characterized by uncertainty among
customers as to the type and quality of the music and hence the value they should place
upon it. The paper finds uniform pricing to be the optimal action for the firms, as it
constitutes a pooling equilibrium across different quality types. Meaning, the firms who
are producing records of different qualities choose the same action. The explanation is
similar to the findings of Orbach (2004), who studies the motion picture industry. He
argues that there is uncertainty regarding the success of newly released movies and there
is a notion that prices would be interpreted as quality signals, thus discriminating the
sales of low-quality goods.
Furthermore, in the wake of Thisse and Vives (1988), several papers contribute to expand
the field of literature on first-degree price discrimination. Thereby, the papers provide
several explanations to this puzzle. Besides the academic literature, as FDPD has become
more relevant with the increasing prevalence of big data, it has become more of a discussed
topic in other fora as well. We will now review different aspects to consider when studying
FDPD and expansions to the original Thisse-Vives model.
2.4.4 Aspects to consider when studying price discrimination
Dynamic or static framework
Several studies present a dynamic framework to study price discrimination, in opposition
to the static model of Thisse and Vives (1988). The models are dynamic in the sense that
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they explicitly incorporate the stage in which firms gather customer information through
interacting with them, before being able to price discriminate in later stages. In relation
to the literature on the field of price discrimination, these models may also be referred to
as behavior-based pricing (BBP). The Thisse-Vives model is described as static since the
firms simply have the choice to price discriminate or not, without having to interact with
users in earlier stages.
In the literature survey of “Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination”
by Armstrong (2006b), the author suggests that BBP models in competitive settings can be
categorized as two different cases. The first case is when firms react to previous consumer
decisions, whereby the firms in the second period try to “poach” the consumers who
preferred the rivalling firm’s product, also called ex-post pricing as the price discrimination
happens after the first period. The second case is when the firms in the first period offer
explicit loyalty schemes to the consumers, named ex-ante pricing as the firms offer pricing
schemes before the consumers do anything. In other words, in the first case the firms do
not commit to prices beforehand, but they do in the latter.
When dealing with dynamic models such as these, it is necessary to make assumptions as
to whether consumer preferences change between the periods. On the one end, one could
assume correlation in brand preference between the periods. Alternatively, consumer
preferences can be considered independently distributed over the two periods. Further,
models such as Chen (1997) considers switching costs as well.
Armstrong (2006b) shows how both practices may involve welfare losses. The first case
(ex-post pricing) may lead to excessive switching between firms, while the second case
(ex-ante pricing) may lead to excessive loyalty. Armstrong (2006b) states that the key
difference is that in ex-post pricing, the aggressive pricing is aimed at the rival’s consumers.
While the ex-ante loyalty scheme involves pricing low at your own customer base.
In case of ex-post pricing, excessive switching implies that too many consumers switch
which firm they purchase from in between the periods, thereby purchasing from the less
preferred firm. On the other hand, excessive loyalty implies that the rivalling firm will
have inferior conditions to compete for the other firm’s customers in the second period,
thereby inhibiting what can be described as “healthy” competition. Specific outcomes are
dependent upon assumptions made in each case, however, generally said, the aggressive
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pricing indicates that these types of competitions might be beneficial for the consumer,
and detrimental for profits of the firms (Armstrong, 2006b). Also, in general, we expect
that when firms price discriminate in the ex-post case, profit is decreasing in the extent of
correlation of brand preference, while consumers benefit from a higher correlation. The
reason being that there will not be any motives to try to poach the consumers if the
consumer brand preference is fully uncorrelated between the periods. However, in case of
ex-ante pricing, the more uncorrelated they are, the firms must provide the consumers
more attractive loyalty offers. This implies the firms’ profits are increasing in the extent
of correlation in brand preference in the ex-ante case, which is the opposite to what we
saw under ex-post pricing.
We will look a bit more into the case of ex-post pricing. The main part of the early
literature on BBP considers third-degree price discrimination after the firms have collected
data on the consumers. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) offer such a framework with stable
consumer brand preferences, in which firms learn where all consumers purchased in the
first period. However, the firms do not get any more specific details about the consumer
preferences. They find that more information about the consumers triggers aggressive
competition and a prisoner’s dilemma situation occurs (Foros et al., 2018).
This framework is evolved by Choe et al. (2018) to regard personalized pricing in the
second period. Choe et al. study the implication of big data on price discrimination. Their
focus is “pricing with cookies”, a way of tracking consumer data and collecting information
in the digital economy. Information collection can provide highly personalized pricing.
They point out that the collection of information by firms typically will be asymmetric, as
the information a firm retrieve from tracking the behavior of a consumer naturally is only
available to that specific firm. On the other hand, the firms are endowed with symmetric
information about the consumers in the Thisse-Vives model. Furthermore, Choe et al.
find that the asymmetric information leads to equilibria in which the firms try to exploit
their acquired information to increase their market share in the second period. This allows
them to charge higher prices to consumers in second period. However, both firms are
worse off with personalized pricing compared to third-degree price discrimination (Foros
et al., 2018). This relates to how the flexibility of personalized pricing can be more of a
curse than a blessing.
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The significance of information
Armstrong (2006b) points out that the industry profit in the static Thisse-Vives model,
which we have seen to be t2 with price discrimination, is slightly lower than the industry
profit in a related model by Bester and Petrakis (1996) (which can be calculated to be
5
9t). In the Bester-Petrakis’ model the firms simply observes whether a given consumer
has a brand preference for their own firm or the rival. This means whether x is greater
or less than 12 . The set-up drives the firms to set two price schedules, a higher price
to those on their own “turf” and a lower price for those on the rival’s turf. Hence, the
consumers closest to the middle, will choose to buy from the firm they are the least loyal
to, since it can offer the lowest generalized prize. This is an inefficient solution, similar to
what we saw under ex-post pricing, as consumers split in half and a proportion of them
are travelling across the middle of the Hotelling line. The higher profits for the firms in
Bester-Petrakis model are a result of the softened competition because of the less precise
information compared to the perfect information in the Thisse-Vives model.
Moreover, Armstrong refers to Liu and Serfes (2004) who propose that these two models
can be thought of as extremes, having either perfect information of the consumers’ locations
or being able to simply identify consumer’s preferred firm. Furthermore, they find that if
the firms have somewhat less than perfect information, then the firms will obtain less profit
than if they had perfect information. Under even less information the profit will start
increasing again, meaning that the profit as a function of information is a non-monotonic
function with a U-shape.
We can relate these findings to the increased information of consumers with the use of
big data. Liu and Serfes (2004) show that the consumer welfare has an inverted U-shape
over the information precision. This implies that a middling information amount over
consumers will be beneficial for consumers, but increasing or decreasing the degree of
information from this level, the consumers will become worse off. By this logic, the effect
of big data and increased information, will depend on the ex-ante level of information.
Minimalist architect Ludwig Miles van der Rohe popularized the phrase “Less is more”.
Evidently, that can be applied to industrial economics as well in terms of firm’s access to
information in duopoly competition.
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Consumer preferences regarding fairness
A possible explanation to the uniform pricing puzzle is consumers’ moral distaste for price
discrimination. An example of this is when the e-commerce vendor Amazon sold the
same DVDs at different prices to different customers based on their purchase history. The
pricing policy was discovered by their customers and Amazon received a backlash. Hence,
Amazon stopped the policy and gave thousands of customers refunds (Wallheimer, 2016).
Notably, they avoided denoting it as dynamic pricing, rather they referred to it as a price
test to estimate consumers’ response to different discount levels.
From a theoretical point of view, Steinberg (2020) argues that price discrimination
“unfairly undermines consumers’ ability to benefit from the market, which is the very point
of having a market” (p. 97). A counterargument to this statement may be that a market
is facilitating a transaction between buyer and seller, and the point of a market would be
the transaction itself, which offers value to at least one of the parties. However, as we
have seen, FDPD may distort the distribution of the economic surplus. Here one may
present normative assessments of what a fair solution would be, which we will not go
further into. Steinberg’s statement is problematized by considering the following scenario
presented in the Chicago Booth Review-article “Are you ready for personalized pricing”
(Wallheimer, 2016), referring to Dubé and Misra (2017): A monopolistic firm, which
sets a uniform price, knows customers are willing to pay between two and five dollars
for a juice cartoon. The profit maximizing price for the firm may then be four dollars,
and thereby excluding customers willing to only pay less than four dollars. In this way,
price discrimination expands the market, allowing more consumers to benefit from a
marketplace, and somewhat contradicts the original statement by Steinberg.
Even so, theorizing ethical concerns regarding FDPD only get us so far. In many ways,
what counts for the firm, is simply the consumers’ perception of these practices. Li and
Jain (2016) extend the literature by implementing fairness concerns into the dynamic, two-
period duopoly model of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) where firms can price discriminate
based on past behavior. By doing so, they find that BBP might be more profitable than
not practicing BBP. This is conditional on consumers having sufficiently strong fairness
concerns. This contrasts previous studies showing that BBP often yields lower profits
than without applying BBP. The result arises because the fairness concerns ease the
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aggressive competition we otherwise would have seen in the second period in models such
as Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
Market size
An aspect yet to be studied, is the significance of market size. The market size is relevant
both on the supply and demand side of the market. On the supply side, the increased
market size will presumably have positive effects on the costs of production. The intuition
is that the larger size will reduce the unit cost of every product, commonly known as
economies of scale. According to Cachon and Harker (2002), this may lead to more
aggressive pricing by the firms in both the uniform and price discriminatory situation
(Foros et al., 2017).
Nonetheless, this thesis focuses on how firms can apply the capabilities of big data on the
demand side. In industries reliant on big data, an additional user is not only valuable as
for the extra income the user brings itself. The user also provides value in form of more
data that will be valuable for the firm over every other user. By the same intuition as for
the cost side, the firm has extra incentives to compete harder for the marginal user and
leads to more aggressive behavior.
As the name suggest, big data is applicable for the firms with access to large amounts of
data. However, according to Foros et al. (2018), smaller firms may instead buy access to
data from third-party providers. Such competition may be intense (Varian, 2018). High
production costs and cheap reproduction costs are characteristically for information-based
industries. Furthermore, a key feature in digital platforms is network effects. As we
described the cost advantages due to the scale of their operation as economies of scale, the
network effects have fittingly been termed economies of scale on the demand side (Shapiro
and Varian, 1998).
The network effects may apply across groups, as we have seen gives rise to two-sided
markets. A general framework of price discrimination and two-sided markets is presented
by Liu and Serfes (2013). In their model two platforms are competing and facilitating for
two groups of agents exhibiting positive externalities to each other. We may expect from
the competitive nature of FDPD in a duopoly and what we know from the literature on
two-sided markets that combining these two results will give an even more competitive
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environment with low prices and profits. However, under certain conditions, FDPD is
increasing the platform profits and decreasing the consumer surplus. This arises when the
marginal cost is low relative to the cross-group network effects, which is characteristic for
our situation with digital platforms.
Liu and Serfes (2013) present the intuition behind the result. In two-sided markets, FDPD
has two effects on competition. First, and equivalent to one-sided markets, the prices
charged by the firms are differing by the difference in transportation costs for the consumer.
This will be the optimal price setting by the firms, since if a firm sets a price differential
lower than the differential in transportation costs, the firm will be relinquishing additional
income. On the other hand, if the differential is too large, the consumer will naturally opt
for the rivalling firm. This constraint on price setting is a negative effect on firms’ profits
as it reduces their flexibility. However, FDPD may, under the stated conditions, have a
positive effect as well. This is because under uniform pricing the prices will be dependent
on the cross-group externality, and FDPD may make the cross-group externality irrelevant
in equilibrium. Through the high externalities, the firms will price aggressively for the
consumers located towards the center of the line, since an extra consumer is valuable to
every agent in the other group. However, there is a threshold as to how aggressive they
can price. In their framework there is a “limit price” of zero as they assume that prices
must be non-negative.
When pricing uniformly, one must price lower to all consumers to attract the extra
consumers, while with a price discriminatory practice one can extract all the surplus from
those located the closest to oneself. By this, firms will not compete away their profits.
They simply cannot do that because they are restricted by the limit price. In so, the
cross-group externality will be irrelevant in this scenario. Hence, liberating the firms from
this effect, as we do when going from uniform to discriminatory pricing, makes a positive
impact by softening competition.
Kodera (2015) also presents a spatial model of price discrimination in two-sided markets.
The main purpose of the study is to consider whether price discrimination in media
markets is favorable for media platforms, consumers and advertisers. In contrast to Liu
and Serfes (2013), Kodera’s study allows negative prices and assumes asymmetric network
effects. In Liu and Serfes’ model, the platforms simultaneously offer discriminatory prices
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for two groups and allow platforms to price discriminate on both sides. In Kodera’s model,
the platforms can only offer uniform prices to consumers, while the platforms can choose
to price discriminate over the advertisers.9 Under certain conditions, the results of Kodera
extend the findings of Liu and Serfes (2013). As long as the negative network effects are
large enough, a platform’s profit is higher under price discrimination than with uniform
prices. On the other hand, if the negative network effects are moderate while platforms
price discriminate the advertisers, both the consumers and the platforms are worse off.
Quality
Investments in quality can be included in duopoly models. We will investigate two different
ways of modelling quality investments. Generally, following Choudhary et al. (2005),
“quality” is any features that may affect a consumer’s WTP.
First, Choudhary et al. (2005) consider a vertically differentiated duopoly, i.e. the two
firms can differentiate themselves in a quality space. This diverges from the Thisse-Vives
model, which regards horizontal differentiation. Naturally, to avoid the Bertrand paradox,
the firms are assumed to differentiate themselves into a high- and a low-quality firm. This
is consistent with the findings of Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
Choudhary et al. (2005) show that a higher quality firm can be worse off with personalized
pricing, contrasting the seminal Thisse-Vives model and the model of Shaffer and Zhang
(2002).10 The rationale behind this result is that FDPD induces the rival to improve its
product quality relative to when pricing uniformly. For the higher quality firm, it would
be damaging to induce the rival to increase its quality as the firms then will move closer
in the quality space and thereby cause fiercer competition. Therefore, it might be in the
higher quality firm’s interest to opt for uniform pricing to mitigate the strategic incentives
the rival has to increase the quality of its product.
Secondly, Matsumura and Matsushima (2015) present a framework more akin to the
familiar set-up from Thisse and Vives (1988). They extend the Thisse-Vives model by
allowing firms to invest in reduced marginal cost after determining their pricing policies.
9
The paper also makes an extension which considers price discrimination on both sides.
10
This is a model of spatial competition with firms that offer products of different quality. They show
that the firm with the high-quality products can benefit from personalized pricing through an increased
market share.
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This will be mathematically equivalent to an increase in the consumer’s utility functions
by a sufficiently large, positive constant, v. Additionally, their model separates itself from
Thisse and Vives by having asymmetric firms, such that one of the firms have an ex-ante
quality (cost) advantage over the other firm. As it is more relevant to our model, we
will consider investments to be in quality, not to achieve a cost advantage. Opposing
Choudhary et al. (2005), Matsumura and Matsushima (2015) find that the firm with
the cost advantage will always prefer to price discriminate, while the firm providing the
inferior product will choose to price uniformly if the difference in quality is sufficiently
large.
Investments in increased quality are shown to be strategic substitutes. Meaning, if one
of the firms increase its investments, it would be optimal for the rivalling firm do the
opposite and reduce its investment level. However, prices are strategic complements as
usual in Bertrand competition. Furthermore, the strategic aspects of FDPD (or more
accurately the absence of them) come to play here as well. When both firms employ
FDPD, one firm’s quality improving activities do not affect the prices of the opposing
firm, rather it alters the market shares. The higher the quality they can provide, the
larger number of consumers will prefer their product. Following, the larger number of
consumers they serve, the greater the returns from quality improving activities. This
holds conversely as well and implies that the greater the ex-ante quality difference, the
less incentives there are for the inferior firm to improve its quality.
On the other hand, if the inferior firm prices uniformly, a quality improvement from
the superior firm will not only affect the distribution of consumers they serve, but also
the price of the uniform firm. The quality improvement accelerates competition, as the
firm’s original market power from consumer loyalty becomes relatively less important.
Therefore, the effect on the rivalling firm’s price setting weakens the incentive of the
superior firm to invest in quality compared to before. Analogous as to before, this effect
will be proportionally larger with the ex-ante cost difference.
Summing up, quality investments from both firms accelerate the competition, which hurts
the inferior firm the most, gradually more with larger ex-ante quality differences. The
lower quality firm therefore wishes to reduce the investments in quality and soften the
competition. Thus it will opt for uniform pricing for this strategic reason.
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The qualitatively different results in Choudhary et al. (2005) and Matsumura and
Matsushima (2015) stem from the different model set-ups. Choudhary et al. (2005)
do not allow for horizontal differentiation and they differ in how quality improvements
affect costs. However, Matsumura and Matsushima (2015) point out that the most
important difference lies in how an increase in product quality increases consumers’ WTP.
In Matsumura and Matsushima (2015), an increase in quality increases the WTP equally
for all consumers as the quality improvements are modelled similarly for all consumers
as the constant v. However, in Choudhary et al. (2005), the consumers differ in their
valuation of a quality improvement.
Non-price variables
We have seen throughout the literature review that extending the original framework of
Thisse and Vives (1988) and loosening up on their assumptions, the result of a prisoner’s
dilemma situation and inclination towards price discrimination do not hold for every
situation.
Furthermore, Foros et al. (2018) show that the more general result of the prisoner’s
dilemma situation is entirely dependent on the assumption that prices are the firms only
choice variable. Departing from this and opening for other non-price variables, they find
that it might be a dominant strategy to not employ FDPD.
In the model of Foros et al. (2018), the firms choose whether to commit to uniform
prices in stage 0, before they do anything else. Moreover, the prices offered under price
discrimination to each consumer are irrelevant of the strategic effect which is present
under uniform pricing. It draws on the same intuition as we observe in Matsumura and
Matsushima (2015), where choosing the pricing policy affects the quality decision of the
rivaling firm. Therefore, the decision in stage 0 can be said to be a choice of “. . . whether
to give the rival strategic incentives to soften competition through non-price variables”
(Foros et al., 2018, p. 3). In turn, this may invalidate the prisoner’s dilemma outcome.
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3 Model
In this section we present a duopoly location model using the spatial model with linear
transportation costs as proposed by Hotelling (1929). We expand on the simplified version
of the Thisse-Vives model presented in the literature review, by including an advertisement
market and the opportunity to invest in quality into our model. Other models include
either vertical differentiation or two-sidedness in a setting similar to the Thisse-Vives
model. Nonetheless, our model is to our knowledge unique in the way that it includes
both of these elements in an unified model.
We consider a market with symmetric duopolists, i = 1, 2, selling horizontally differentiated
goods. The two firms are exogenously located at each end of a Hotelling line with length
normalized to 1. We consider the firms to be two platforms, which connect two distinct
groups of users, advertisers and consumers. In addition to selling a product to consumers,
the platforms sell ad-inserts to advertisers.
The model offers a framework to study firms that have the ability to price discriminate
(employ personalized prices) among consumers through utilization of big data (see e.g.
Choe et al., 2018). We consider a static model, similarly as Thisse and Vives (1988),
implying that the firms are equipped with perfect information over the consumers’ location
x. Furthermore, we include firms’ ad-revenues into our model, as many firms operating in
the digital economy are increasingly dependent on this feature (see e.g. Perrin, 2018). Our
modelling of ad-revenues is basic, nonetheless it illustrates how the increased relevance
of ad-revenues affect the decisions of the firms. Lastly, firms are able to improve their
product or services, which we model as quality investments, in order to become more
attractive to the consumers. Our model is closely related to Matsumura and Matsushima
(2015) in the way it models and combines horizontal and vertical product differentiation,
opening up for first-degree price discrimination.
3.1 Consumer preferences
We model the consumers to care about several different aspects when deciding which
product to buy. Each consumer buys one unit of the product, either from firm 1 or firm 2.
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The consumers’ utility of buying a product from either firm is expressed by the following
utility functions:
U1 = v + q1   p1   tx (3.1)
U2 = v + q2   p2   t(1  x) (3.2)
Firstly, consumers consider how close the product is to their preferences. To represent the
diversity of consumer preferences, we assume that the consumer preferences are uniformly
distributed along a Hotelling line in the interval [0,1], and the density of the consumer
distribution is 1. Consumers do not usually find a product that is a perfect fit, and
therefore the mismatch can be represented as a transportation cost measuring the cost of
the deviation from their preferences. A consumer located at x in the range [0,1] experiences
a linear transportation cost of tx or t(1  x) when buying the product respectively from
firm 1 or 2. Related to the digital economy, the transportation cost can be considered a
measure of the consumer’s choosiness or loyalty for a specific brand.
Secondly, each consumer derives a positive intrinsic value from consuming the product,
denoted by the letter v. We assume that v is sufficiently large to ensure every consumer
purchases one unit of the goods. Further, we assume single-homing consumers. Anecdotally,
we expect that we should see at least some multi-homing consumers in the online retail
economy, however we disregard this possibility to simplify our analysis. Even so, Haucap
and Heimeshoff (2014) argue that multi-homing is to some degree difficult for buyers.11
We enable firms to invest in the quality of the product. We model the quality investments
as a quality component, qi, similarly as Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). The consumers
consider the relative quality difference between the firms, qi   qj, when deciding which
firm they are going to purchase from. A higher quality of the product increases the
consumers’ utility of the product and makes the product more attractive relative to the
other product. We include the quality parameter because in many economic decisions
the quality component bears as much on the outcome of the choice as the quantity
component. In some cases where the consumer buys one unit of the product, only the
quality component plays a role in the decision making by the consumer (Gabszewicz and
11
Haucap and Heimeshoff (2014) explain that this is because it might be difficult to build up a
good reputation on several platforms. A user’s reputation is determined by the number of transactions
conducted over the platform and can potentially be a factor determining prices and whether a transaction
takes place.
Model 36
Thisse, 1979). This can relate to our model where we only allow the consumer to buy one
unit of the product.
As we have seen in the literature review, the literature is ambiguous regarding the effect
of advertisement on consumer utility. While Anderson and Coate (2005) assume that
viewers are affected negatively from advertising intensity, Gabszewicz et al. (2001) assume
consumers to be indifferent to ads. Our model does not include any nuisance cost of
advertisement, meaning the consumers’ utility function does not get affected by consumers’
annoyance of advertisement.12 Anecdotally, advertisement on platforms such as the
example of Amazon is often seen as a nuisance. It would be a hassle to scroll through
several cheap rip-off versions of a product that is advertised if you search for a specific
high-quality pair of headphones, for instance. On the other hand, advertisements may
have an informative and positive value on the consumer utility. Consequently, it is not
obvious what the sign of the effect should be on consumer utility.
If the firms opt to use personalized pricing, each consumer is offered the product at an
individual price of pi(x), where x is the location of the consumer on the Hotelling line. In
contrast, if the firms use uniform pricing, all of the consumers are offered the same price
independently of the location, pi(x) = pi. Given that firm 1 and 2 set the prices p1(x) and
p2(x), consumer x buys the product from firm 1 if p1(x) + tx  q1  p2(x) + t(1  x)  q2.
In the case of p1(x) + tx   q1 = p2(x) + t(1   x)   q2, we assume that the consumer
randomly chooses one of the products.
3.2 Advertisers
The models of Liu and Serfes (2013) and Kodera (2015) are examples of models
that incorporate two-sidedness into a duopoly model that allows for first-degree price
discrimination. In Liu and Serfes (2013), the two sides exhibit positive network effects
on each other, while Kodera (2015) operates with asymmetric network effects between
an advertiser and a consumer side. Furthermore, in Liu and Serfes (2013) the firms can
discriminate both consumer groups, while in Kodera (2015) the firms can discriminate on
the advertiser side.
12
A more elaborate review of the consumer’s sentiment to advertisement is found in the section
Two-sided markets 2.3, in the literature review.
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However, we specifically look at situation with consumers on one side and an advertisement
market on the other, and we allow for price discrimination over the consumers. The
consumers exhibit positive network effects on the advertiser side.
There are several ways of modelling advertisers in two-sided markets. Gal-Or et al. (2012)
distribute the advertisers along the same Hotelling line as the consumers and assume
heterogeneity among the advertisers. Thereby, the advertisers prefer to advertise to
the consumers closest aligned to their own location as these consumers are most likely
to consider their products. In Ellman and Germano (2009), readers get influenced by
advertisement differently, and consequently the advertisers choose to target the consumers
that are the most receptive to advertisement.
Our model closely follows the assumptions by Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002) regarding the
advertisers.13 Similarly to Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002), we model that the advertisers
differ in the intensity of their preferences of buying advertisement. The advertisers’
intensity for buying an ad-insert is represented by ✓ in the range of [0,1]. Moreover, a
larger number of consumers buying from a firm results in a larger number of people that
will receive the advertisement message. Naturally, an advertiser’s utility increases by the
number of consumers. Thus, an advertiser’s valuation of advertising at firm i is given by
the product of the number of consumers, xi, and the intensity of preferences for buying
the ad-insert, ✓.
Also similar to Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002), we include the aspect of perfectly elastic
demand for advertisement. Perfectly elastic demand for advertisement implies that the
firms do not need to set the level of advertisement. Contrasting, Peitz and Valletti (2008)
assume imperfectly elastic advertisement demand.
Advertisers can buy ad-inserts at firm i at the cost of ri. Therefore, an advertiser’s net
utility of buying an advertisement at firm i is represented by the following expression:
uAi = ✓xi   ri (3.3)
To simplify impending calculations, we follow Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002), assuming
that the density of advertisers of type ✓ is constant and equal to 4k. We further assume
13
The way we model the advertisement market is inspired by Hansen and Tho (2017).
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that advertisers cannot engage in multi-homing. In contrast to us, Gabszewicz et al. (2001,
2002) allow multi-homing. Nonetheless, the market outcome does not change because of
the assumption of perfectly elastic demand for advertisement. Assuming ✓ to be equal to
4k implies that k is a representation of the population size of advertisers. Consequently, a
larger k will increase a firm’s advertising revenue, all else equal.
3.3 Firms
The firms earn their revenues from two different sources, by selling their product to
consumers and by selling ad-inserts to advertisers. When pricing uniformly, the total
revenue from consumers will be the price multiplied by the demand for the product, pixi.
When price discriminating, they will take the highest price possible from each consumer
they serve. In the next chapter we will look at how this price is set. To find the consumer
revenue when price discriminating, we will need to integrate a price function over their
market share of consumers. By integrating we find the area under the price function over
the relevant range of x, which equals their consumer revenue.
The firms’ revenue from the advertiser side Ai is the price ri per ad-inserts sold times
the demand for advertisement ai. We make the simplifying assumption of zero marginal
costs, both from selling the product and advertisements. The firms can invest in quality
to make their product more attractive to consumers and thereby increase their market
share. Quality improvements in the digital economy might be considered to be improved
user interface, better customer services, shortened delivery time, etc. When investing in
quality, the firms incur an investment cost of C(qi) =  2 q
2
i . We assume that the constant
  > 0 is sufficiently large to fulfill all second order conditions for profit maximization.
We assume, as Anderson et al. (2017), the cost function to be sufficiently convex to ensure
the existence of a stable, symmetric equilibrium. The investment cost function satisfies
the criteria of C(qi)   0, C 0(qi) > 0 and C 00(qi) > 0. Generally, the profit of firm i is
hence given by:






We consider a four-stage game with two firms in a two-sided market. The game developes
in the following order:
Stage 1: The firms choose between the pricing policies uniform prices (UP) and
personalized pricing (PP).
Stage 2: The firms invest in quality. Firm 1 chooses the level of quality q1, and firm 2
chooses the level of quality q2.
Stage 3: The two firms set the prices (r1, r2) in the advertisement market.
Stage 4: In the last stage, the firms set the prices (p1(x), p2(x)) in the consumer market.
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4 Analysis
To find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we solve the sequential game by backward
induction. Therefore, we start the analysis with the last stage, i.e. the price game.
Throughout the analysis we need to consider the different combinations of pricing policies
by the firms. We can consider three cases since we have symmetric firms. Either both
firms price uniformly, both firms price discriminate or they differ, where one chooses to
price discriminate and the other prices uniformly. In the latter case, we consider firm 1 to
be the firm pricing uniformly and firm 2 to be the firm price discriminating (UP,PP).
Throughout, we will use the notations in table 4.1 to indicate the pricing policy of each
firm.
Combinations of pricing policies Type of notation
Both firms set uniform prices UP,UP
Firm 1 sets a uniform price, while firm 2 employs personalized prices UP,PP
Both firms employ personalized prices PP,PP
Table 4.1: Notations of pricing policies
We will only consider cases where the second order conditions for quality investments are
satisfied. Therefore, we assume: t  < 12 .
14
4.1 One-sided market
The one-sided case is characterized by not having any advertisement market and therefore
we disregard the third stage in the presented model set-up. The firms maximize the
following profit function:









First, we consider the case where both firms price uniformly. Before we can find the
optimal prices, we need to derive the demand functions faced by each platform. We solve
for the indifferent consumer by setting the utility functions equal to each other (equations











The demand for firm 1 is x1 = x̃, while the demand for firm 2 is x2 = 1   x̃. Firm i
(i=1,2) will attract more consumers by offering either a lower price (@xi@pi < 0) or a higher
quality relative to the rival (@xi@qi > 0), everything else equal.
The firms maximize the following profit function when choosing their optimal price:











An increased price results in increased revenue per unit a firm sells, but lowers the number











We get the usual result that prices are strategic complements, @pi@pj > 0.






Substituting the symmetric price pj into pi (equation 4.3) and solving for the two firms’
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We find that the optimal uniform prices of the firms are increasing in their product quality
and decreasing in the rival’s product quality (@pi@qi > 0,
@pi
@qj
< 0), all else equal. Furthermore,
we get the typical result that by a higher value of t, the firms can take a higher price as
the competitive pressure falls.
Substituting the optimal prices (equation 4.4) into the expression for the indifferent









The next case we will consider, is when the firms differ in their pricing schemes. We
consider the case where firm 1 is employing UP and firm 2 is employing PP. In this
situation, firm 1 sets its price first, while firm 2 sets its prices after observing the rival’s
choice.
The consumers decide which firm they buy from by comparing the utility they receive
from purchasing from either firm. Consumer x will buy from firm 2 if:
p1 + tx  q1 > p2(x) + t(1  x)  q2
p2(x) < p1 + t(2x  1) + q2   q1
If the right-hand side of the latter inequality is less than zero, firm 2 will not be able to
attract a consumer regardless the price it set, given that we have non-negative prices.
However, if it is greater than 0, firm 2 will set a price incrementally lower than the
mentioned right-hand side of the latter inequality, p2(x) = p1 + t(2x  1) + q2   q1   ".
We will regard " as sufficiently small and omit this value. Hence, the optimal price of
firm 2 at point x is given by:
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p2(x) =
p1 + t(2x  1) + q2   q1,
0,
if p1 + t(2x  1) + q2   q1 > 0
if otherwise
The indifferent consumer, x̃UP,PP , is implicitly given by:
p1 + t(2x̃  1) + q2   q1 = 0









We find the uniform price of firm 1 by differentiating the profit function (equation 4.2)














We observe that we move from dividing the market in half to an expression that is based









The last case we will consider, is when both of the firms are price discriminating.
We use a similar set-up as in the previous case. Consumers will buy from firm 1 if,
p1(x) + tx  q1 < t(1  x)  q2. The optimal price of firm 1 and 2 at point x is given by:
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p1(x) =
t(1  2x) + q1   q2,
0,
if t(1  2x) + q1   q2 > 0
if otherwise
p2(x) =
t(2x  1) + q2   q1,
0,
if t(2x  1) + q2   q1>0
if otherwise










Next, we solve for the optimal quality investments by the firms.
UP,UP
Combining the optimal price (equation 4.4) and the expression for the indifferent consumer
(equation 4.1) into the profit function (equation 4.2), we obtain the profit function as an
expression of the quality levels:
⇡i =





Differentiating the profit function with respect to qi and solving for qi gives us the firms’





Inserting the optimal quality investment (equation 4.9) back into the price function
(equation 4.4), we get the optimal price:
pi = t
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As the firms are symmetric and both are pricing uniformly, they divide the market equally
between themselves and we get the price, t. This is equivalent to what we present in the
literature review as an example of the original Thisse-Vives model. However, their profits
are lowered by 118  . This is because of the quality investments. The consumers are the
beneficiaries of the introduction of ability to invest in quality. They pay the same prices
as in the simplified Thisse-Vives model, while they at the same time get a better product.
We get the intuitive result that the higher the investment cost, the lower the optimal
quality level (@q1@  < 0). Consequently, an increased investment cost will be advantageous
for the firms in terms of the weakened pressure to invest in quality, all else equal. The
firms weigh the marginal benefit of an extra consumer up against the marginal cost of
quality investments when considering optimal quality levels. Given an increased cost of
investments they would need to capture a relatively larger market share to uphold the
relative size of quality level to the cost of investments.
UP,PP
Inserting firm 1’s optimal uniform price (equation 4.6) and the quantity demanded of firm
1 (equation 4.7) into their profit function (equation 4.2), we find:
⇡1 =




















Remember, firm 2 observes the uniform price of the rival, p1, before it set its prices.
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The optimal quality levels are found by maximizing the firms’ profit functions (equations







Combining the reaction functions (equations 4.13 and 4.14), we get the optimal quality







Given that the second order conditions for every combination of pricing policies are fulfilled
we have that q1 < q2. This follows the intuition presented by Matsumura and Matsushima
(2015), that a firm with a larger market size will be more inclined to invest in quality as
it has a greater output over which it can apply the added quality level. Firm 2 has the
greater market share (x1 = 2 t 18 t 3 , x2 = 1 
2 t 1
8 t 3), given that our second order conditions
are fulfilled.







We can compare the optimal price for firm 1 under (UP,UP) and (UP,PP), given the





2(8 t 3) . Given that the second order conditions are fulfilled, we have that when
the rival is price discriminating instead of pricing uniformly, a firm will set a lower uniform
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price. This is needed to meet the aggressive competition of the rival.
PP,PP























Noteworthy, the functions which the firms integrate, are not dependent on the prices set
by the rival, while under (UP,PP), the price discriminating firm’s profit is dependent on
the rival’s uniform price (see equation 4.11 which consists of p1).
The optimal quality levels are found by maximizing their profits (equation 4.17) with




Thereafter, we get the optimal level of quality investments as a function of   by substituting




Comparing the quality levels under different pricing schemes, we see that there are
higher quality levels when both firms are price discriminating relative to when both are
pricing uniformly (qUP,UPi < q
PP,PP
i ). This follows the same reasoning we had in the
original Thisse-Vives model; under price discrimination there is harder competition for the
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consumers, as it enables the firms to compete for each consumer individually. However, in
this framework, the fiercened competition takes shape in higher quality levels.
Furthermore, we observe another feature consistent with the Thisse-Vives findings;
















4.1.3 Choice of pricing policy
































Figure 4.1: Payoff matrix in the one-sided market






2 are positive for any values of  
and t that satisfies our second order conditions. Meaning, employing PP dominates
employing UP regardless of what the rival chooses. This, combined with the fact the
profit is collectively higher when both are pricing uniformly (⇡UP,UPi > ⇡
PP,PP
i ), implies
that we have the same prisoner’s dilemma situation as in the original Thisse-Vives.
Proposition 1: Under the one-sided market, the optimal pricing policy of the firms will
be to employ personalized prices.
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Logically, the same intuition is present here as well. Going from UP to PP expands the
market for the individual firm. We have one further effect compared to the Thisse-Vives
model, which is also seen in the model of Matsumura and Matsushima (2015). The choice
of pricing policy is also a choice of quality level. When a firm opts for personalized
prices, it will adopt a higher quality level. We conclude that the introduction of quality
investments does not alter the choice of pricing policy compared to our example from the
Thisse-Vives model under a one-sided market.
4.2 Two-sided market
In this section we model duopoly competition between firms selling goods in a two-sided
market. In a two-sided market we have to take into consideration the earnings the firms
have from selling ad-inserts to advertisers, Ai. Therefore, the firms in the two-sided market
will maximize the following profit function:





In the last stage, the firms set the prices in the consumer market. The firms maximize











Advertisements have already been sold when the prices in the consumer market are to be
set in the last stage. As a consequence prices will not effect the advertisement level and
we can set @Ai@pi = 0. For this reason, we can skip the calculations for the price game and
refer to the equilibrium solutions we present in section 4.1.1 Price game.
4.2.2 Advertisement game
In the third stage of the model, the firms are going to set the optimal prices for
advertisement. By using the advertisers’ net utility function of buying an ad-insert,
uAi = ✓xi   ri (equation 3.3), we can find the location of the indifferent advertiser. The
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advertiser which is indifferent between buying an ad-insert or not is located such that:
uAi = 0 , ✓ =
ri
xi
As stated earlier, the density of advertisers is equal to 4k, which implies that the demand












Figure 4.2: Demand for advertisement
The demand for advertisement is independent of the rival’s price because of the assumption
of perfectly elastic demand for advertisement. Thus, each firm maximizes its advertisement
revenues, Ai = airi, independent of the competing firm’s price for ad-insert, rj. We
get the following expression for advertisement revenue by substituting the demand for
advertisement (equation 4.19) into the expression for the firms’ revenue in the advertisement
market, Ai:














This gives us the equilibrium revenue of:
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A⇤i = xik (4.20)















> 0). We have that when the demand for the product increases, the
platform get more users and in turn increasing the advertisers’ valuation of advertising.
4.2.3 Quality game
In the second stage, we solve for the firms’ optimal investments in quality. Similarly, as
to the one-sided case, the prices are given from section 4.1.1 Price game, thus we must
also in this stage consider the three separate cases. However, with the introduction of an
advertisement market, we need to add the firms’ advertisement revenue. The advertisers
are indifferent to the level of quality per se; however, a higher level of quality increases
the firm’s market share and consequently the advertisers’ potential outreach.
UP,UP
By substituting the equilibrium advertisement revenues (equation 4.20) into the firms’
profit functions (equation 4.18), we can express the firms’ profit function in a two-sided
market as:








Substituting the corresponding price and demand expressions (equations 4.4 and 4.5) into














By the same approach as before, we find the optimal levels of quality:
qi =





We find that the investment levels increase with the size of the two-sided market (@qi@k =
1
6 t).
A larger advertisement market increases the competition for the consumers as they become
increasingly valuable.







  (k + 2t)
2
72 t2
By this intuition, we would also expect lower prices offered to the consumers compared
to the one-sided case, while in our model set-up there are not any changes in the prices.
Lower prices because of the introduction of an advertisement market is a typical feature
in two-sided markets (Armstrong, 2006b). As more thoroughly discussed in the literature
review, this characteristic stems from a subsidization of the market that exerts the greatest
externalities on the other side. Nonetheless, we do not observe this in our model, the reason
being that the timing of the game does not allow for the firms to consider advertisement
revenue when they are setting their prices.
In our model, the increased competition through larger advertisement market size manifests
itself in higher product quality rather than lowered prices. As we remember, the prices
are set before we consider the advertisement level and they are therefore not affected by
the advertisement size, k. Contrastingly, the quality investments are higher in a two-sided
market than in a one-sided market. We can observe this by comparing the quality levels
when both firms are pricing uniformly. While we have qi = 13  in a one-sided market, it
increases to qi = 13  +
k
6 t in a two-sided market. The result of higher quality investments




Inserting firm 1’s optimal uniform price (equation 4.6), the demand of firm 1 (equation
4.7) and the equilibrium advertisement revenue (equation 4.20) into the profit function
(equation 4.18), we find:
⇡1 =











Following the same approach as under the one-sided market, and including the
advertisement revenue, kx2, we can express the profit function for the price discriminating










































2k + 3t  q1
8 t  1
Combining the reaction functions of the quality levels gives us the optimal levels of quality:
q1 =
8k t+ 8 t2   3k   4t
32 2t2   12 t (4.25)
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q2 =
8k t+ 12 t2   3k   4t
32 2t2   12 t (4.26)
Substituting the optimal quality levels into the price function for firm 1, we get the same
expression as in the one-sided case, p1 = t2  
1
2(8 t 3) . This implies that the uniform price
is independent of k.
By plotting the optimal quality levels (equations 4.25 and 4.26) into the profit functions








We follow the same approach as under the one-sided market. Additionally, we include
the advertisement revenue, Ai = kxi, where xi can be expressed as 12 +
1
2t(qi   qj) (see
equation 4.8). Thereby, when both firms are price discriminating, the profit expressions







































k + t  qj
2 t  1
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We get the same result as in the one-sided case, that there are higher quality levels when
both firms are price discriminating compared to when pricing uniformly (qPP,PPi > q
UP,UP
i ).







  (k + t)
2
8 t2
Comparing the profits when the firms choose matching pricing policies, the profits under
uniform pricing are larger than under price discrimination (⇡UP,UPi > ⇡
PP,PP
i ). Further,











4.2.4 Choice of pricing policy
In the first stage, the platforms choose between employing a uniform price or to price
discriminate. We set up the following payoff matrix, depicting the profits under different

















































Figure 4.3: Payoff matrix in the two-sided market
In the one-sided market we find that the profits are always higher when price discriminating
compared to when pricing uniformly, regardless of the rival’s pricing policy (⇡UP,PP2  




2 > 0). This holds for any positive values of   and t
that satisfies our second order conditions. Therefore, price discrimination constitutes a
dominant strategy for the firms. However, this is not necessarily the case anymore with
the introduction of two-sided markets.
When plotting the expressions for the differences in profits for firm 2 when  , t = 1, we
get the inverse U-shaped graphs in figure 4.4. The red, solid graph shows the situation in
which firm 1 is pricing uniformly. The blue, dashed graph shows when firm 1 employs
personalized prices.
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Figure 4.4: Differences in profits for firm 2 when pricing uniformly or price discriminating,
given the pricing scheme of firm 1
We observe that the difference ⇡PP,PP2  ⇡
PP,UP
2 (the blue, dashed line) is positive for k = 1,
while it turns negative before k = 2. A negative ⇡PP,PP2  ⇡
PP,UP
2 implies that firm 2 would
do better pricing uniformly than price discriminating, given that firm 1 price discriminates.
Technically, we denote the positive value of k where ⇡PP,PP2   ⇡
PP,UP
2 becomes negative
as k⇤. This indicates that if the advertisement market is sufficiently large, relative to
the consumer market, we have duopoly competition in which price discrimination is not
necessarily the dominant strategy.
If k is larger than k⇤, approximately 1.5, given the parameter values of  , t = 1, and
the rival price discriminates, the firm will earn a higher profit by choosing a uniform
price than choosing to price discriminate. The firms’ payoff structures do not any longer
resemble the previous prisoner’s dilemma situation we have under the one-sided market.
Rather, the firms will now prefer to choose opposite actions of each other. Moreover,
each firm would ideally see the rivalling firm price uniformly and be the firm which price
discriminates itself.
We have two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria and one symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium. This situation forces the firms’ optimal strategies to be a mixed strategy,
rather than a pure strategy as previously. A mixed strategy implies that a firm chooses
either to price discriminate or to price uniformly randomly, given by a probability
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distribution over each choice. Therefore, we can state that price discrimination will
not always be the firms’ chosen pricing policy.
Proposition 2: Under the two-sided market, the optimal pricing policy of the firms will
be to employ personalized prices for values of k up to k⇤. When k > k⇤, the optimal
pricing policy of the firms will be determined by a mixed strategy.
Before we go any further into the economic rationale for these findings of our model, we
need to address a significant feature of our model. We have throughout this analysis seen
that in the two-sided market, the optimal investment levels are monotonically increasing
in k (@qi@k > 0). Moreover, when firms are maximizing their profits with regards to quality
investments, they incur investment costs that grow convexly over the investment level. As
a consequence of the convex investment costs, at an adequately high k, the investment
costs will be so high that the profits will be negative. We will neglect ranges of k in which
the profits of the firms are negative. Implicitly, this can be considered as a limit as to
how high their quality investment levels can be.
















Figure 4.5: Profit expressions under the two-sided market
We have that the expression ⇡PP,PP2   ⇡
PP,UP
2 (figure 4.4) turns negative, before that of
⇡PP,PPi (figure 4.5), when k increases. This entails that we are within a permissible range
of q. As for ⇡UP,PP2   ⇡
UP,UP
2 (figure 4.4), this expression is positive for all permissible
Analysis 59
values of q, implying that when the rival prices uniformly the firm will always prefer to
price discriminate.
To understand why firms are no longer consistently opting to price discriminate when we
have a two-sided market, we need to consider what the effects are when a firm goes from
offering a uniform price to price discriminating when the rival price discriminates (i.e.
from (UP,PP) to (PP,PP)). Furthermore, it is essential to see how these effects depend on
the relative importance of the advertisement market (k). First, we will examine how a
firm’s incentives to invest in quality differ under the two pricing schemes. Secondly, we
will show how the rival, firm 2, is affected by the pricing policy by firm 1.
Price discrimination increases the firm’s market size, as it enables them to compete harder
for the consumers of the rivalling firm without having to set lower prices for its own
target group. Given the second order conditions are fulfilled, we have that the firm
will have a larger market share when price discriminating, given that the rival price
discriminates (xUP,PP1 < x
PP,PP








A larger market share increases the firm’s incentive to invest in quality, as the investments
can be applied to all consumers. Further, a higher k increases the incentives to invest
in quality as the consumers are increasingly more valuable, as they exhibit positive
network effects on the advertiser market. These features entail that the difference in
quality investments under the two pricing schemes of firm 1 will be greater the larger







4 t > 0), as firm 1 profits on corresponding
market expansion over more advertisers.
As we see, a higher k leads to fiercer competition in quality. This is costly for the firms
as an increased quality level comes with convexly growing quality costs (C(q) =  2 q
2).
On the other hand, if firm 1 opts for uniform prices, it relinquish itself from the added
quality level induced by price discrimination relative to employing uniform prices, in a
situation where we have a larger market share. For low values of k, the benefit of lower
quality investments will be overshadowed by the loss in profit from a reduced market
share. However, with a higher k, the effect of lower investment costs will have relatively
more importance compared to the loss in market share. Thus, a firm might be prompted
to choose uniform prices for the reason of weakening its own incentives to make costly
Analysis 60
quality investments.
Now, we can discuss the effects of firm 1’s choice of pricing policy on firm 2 and how
this in turn affect firm 1. If firm 1 chooses to employ uniform prices, it weakens firm 2’s
incentives to invest in quality, as firm 2 must account for the effects of quality investments








4 t > 0), following the same reason as before. There are higher
incentives to invest in quality to attract consumers when the relative importance of the
advertisement market increases.
As before, a larger market share increases the firms’ incentive to invest in quality as the
investments can be applied to all consumers. Thus, a higher k increases the incentives
to choose a pricing policy that lowers the incentives of the rival to invest in quality,
thereby softening the competition for market shares and lowering the pressure on the
prices charged to consumers.
Summing up, we have a direct effect of lowered quality costs stemming from weakened
incentives to invest in quality when pricing uniformly. In addition, we have an indirect
effect of softened competition from the rivalling firm through turning on the strategic
effect on the rival’s price setting by employing uniform prices.
Naturally, if the firms are choosing different pricing schemes, none of the firms would wish
to be the one choosing uniform prices, whilst the other price discriminates. If we consider
firm 2 to be pricing uniformly, the positive effects for firm 1 of going from (UP,UP) to
(PP,UP) will outweigh the induced additional investment costs from price discriminating
rather than employing uniform prices for every k that we consider. As we remember, we
cannot have values of k that induce quality investments which give the firms negative
profits. We can see this in the figure of the different profit expressions (figure 4.5).
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5 Discussion
The purpose of our model is to study the choice of pricing policy for firms in the digital
economy. We focus on the digital economy as the entry of big data has enabled personalized
pricing in this industry. To emulate the digital economy, we have included the characteristic
elements quality investments and an advertisement market into our model. Still, our
model is clearly a simplified depiction of reality. In this chapter, we discuss how our model
adds to the literature on the field and the limitations of our model.
Matsumura and Matsushima (2015) offer a model related to ours, by considering the
same choice of pricing policy, as well as allowing for horizontal differentiation and quality
investments by the firms. Moreover, we follow their model closely in terms of how quality
investments are modelled. We therefore see some of the same mechanisms in our model
as in theirs. Particularly, there is the strategic effect on the rival when choosing to price
uniformly, which ceases to exist when price discriminating. However, there are two main
differences between our and their model set-ups. First of all, Matsumura and Matsushima
(2015) consider a situation in which one of the firms has an ex-ante quality advantage
over the other firm. In their model, it is the size of this ex-ante quality difference that
potentially may induce the inferior firm to opt for uniform prices for the purpose of
weakening the incentives of the rivalling firm to invest in quality. By inducing the rival to
invest relatively less in quality, the firm achieves a softened competition. Comparably,
we consider symmetric firms. Moreover, we contrast Matsumura and Matsushima (2015)
by adding an advertiser market into our model. We analyse two iterations of the model.
We consider both a one-sided and a two-sided market. We see that our result drastically
hinges on whether we include the advertiser market.
In the one-sided case, we achieve a result analogous with that of Thisse and Vives (1988).
Namely, the firms end up in a prisoner’s dilemma situation where both firms choose to
price discriminate, even though pricing uniformly is the preferred option collectively. We
compare the one-sided case of our model with a simplified version of the Thisse-Vives
model presented in the literature review. There is only the firms’ ability to invest in
quality that separates these two models. We find that the consumers benefit from the
introduction of quality investments, while the firms’ profits decrease. Further, the firms’
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profits increase in the investment cost (@⇡i@  > 0).
There are seemingly only a few other papers studying the effect of two-sided markets in
spatial models of first-degree price discrimination. In the literature review we examine
two such papers, Liu and Serfes (2013) and Kodera (2015). However, the firms are not
incentivized to deviate from the choice of personalized prices in either of the models, as
seen in Thisse and Vives (1988). Rather, both articles find that the profits of the firms
may be higher with price discriminatory practices than when offering uniform prices.
In our model, there is a crucial interplay between quality investments and the advertiser
market. An increased market size of advertisers, k, intensifies the competition for consumers
as they are increasingly valuable due to the positive network externality they exert on
the advertiser market. This is because the advertisers’ willingness to pay for ad-inserts
increases in consumer demand for the product. Essentially, a firm would have two ways
to attract consumers with the choice variables included in our model; either it offers lower
prices or a higher quality good. The timing of our game does not allow the firms to
offer lower prices when the advertiser market increases, which one typically would see in
models of two-sided markets. This implies that the firms would invest more in quality
to attract consumers. The neglection of the effect of advertiser market size on consumer
prices is a flaw of our model. Anyway, our model still illustrates how the addition of
an advertising market intensifies the competition for the consumers and how this may
transpire through quality investments. In fact, we obtain the result that the escalated
quality competition prompts the firms to choose a mixed strategy of pricing policies. The
profit-damaging competition in quality resembles the see-saw effect in prices described
by Armstrong (2006b). In this situation, the firms compete away all of the additional
revenue from the addition of an advertisement market. In our model, we do not see the
same profit-ruining competition in prices, however we see some of the same mechanisms
with competition in quality.
Price competition in a duopoly setting such as considered has the natural downward
limit of non-negative prices. This inhibits the firms to compete away all their profits
when they operate in a two-sided market, as we see in the discussion by Liu and Serfes
(2013). On the contrary, quality investments do not exhibit any such limit. This induces
intense competition to offer the highest quality product. Remarkably, the competition
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becomes so intense that it alters what pricing policy will be optimal. Related to the
original Thisse-Vives model, we saw how price discrimination fiercened the competition
and lowered profits. Nonetheless, it would still be the dominant strategy for the firms to
pursue. However, in our model, a large advertisement market size makes it more profitable
to avoid price discrimination if the rival price discriminates, through the softening of the
competition in quality.
Now, we go over to our modelling of the advertiser market. In addition to enabling
personalized prices in the consumer market, the entry of big data also provides personalized
marketing opportunities. For instance, Amazon offers advertisers various different ways
to advertise through their e-commerce service. One of these ways is offering advertisers
the option to buy top spots at the product search results. Amazon labels this type of
advertisement as sponsored products, which promotes individual products listings on
Amazon. Buying advertisement such as sponsored products, will make the product more
visible for customers, thereby influencing the customers to discover and purchase products
that are sponsored (Amazon, n.d.). In contrast, our model constructs a highly simplified
way to model the effect of an advertiser market. We make the assumption of perfectly
elastic demand for advertisement, which is contrasted by several other models (see e.g.
Gal-Or et al., 2012; Ellman and Germano, 2009). In fact, because of our general modelling
of the advertisement market it is possible to view the modelling of the advertisement as a
proxy for more broad sources of revenue stemming from the number of consumers the
firms reach out to.
Further, we only allow for price discrimination in the consumer market, in opposition to
Kodera (2015), who focuses on discrimination on the advertiser side. Moreover, Kodera
(2015) considers that the advertiser side yield negative network externalities on the
consumer side. Due to the ambiguous literature on the field, we disregard the consumers’
sentiment to advertisement in our model. Nonetheless, the advertisement market has
become an essential component of the business models of companies in the digital economy,
and alternative ways of modelling advertisement demand in this type of framework are a
possibility for future research.
Various literature put emphasis on how the modelling of price discrimination as a dynamic
process, rather than as a static model, offers additional insights. Specifically, there is
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customarily a stage in which the firms collect information, and an ensuing stage in which
they can apply this information. This contrasts our strict assumption of firms having
perfect information over all consumers, which is debatable in the real world. Arguably, it
would be more precise to require that the firms need to interact with the consumer to be
able to collect consumer specific information.
Moreover, many firms in the digital economy operate in industries with strong network
effects, modelled by us in the case of a two-sided market. Strong network effects might
potentially create a "winner takes it all"-situation (Navon et al., 1995). Further, a theme
throughout this paper has been how the outcome of price discrimination crucially depends
upon the market structure the firms operate in (e.g. a monopoly or duopoly situation).
Additionally, as discussed by Matsumura and Matsushima (2015) and ourselves, the
relative market shares of the firms make up a pivotal part of the firms’ decision of pricing
structure.
A related aspect is the location incentives of the firms. Our model is an extension of a
basic Hotelling model, where firms are located exogenously at each end of the line. By
doing so, we neglect the location incentives of the firms, which we would be able to study
if we modelled x as an endogenous variable. Similar to relevant literature, we find that
when firm j is employing PP, firm i alleviates itself from the strategic effect its price
setting has on the rival. Foros et al. (2018) find that the firm will locate closer to the rival
that uses PP compared to one that uses uniform pricing for this very reason. Furthermore,
the literature on two-sided markets (see e.g. Kind et al., 2013), suggests that by extending
our Hotelling model from a one-sided to a two-sided market we should see firms locating
even closer to the center of the line. This is because when adding a positive cross-group
externality to our model, the relative importance of the business stealing effect compared
to the strategic effect is increased. Thus, including location incentives may add insights
we have not considered in our model.
In the model, we assume that the firms’ marginal costs of selling their product is constant
and equal to zero. This is mainly due to simplicity of calculations. Moreover, it is a
conventional way to construct models in the literature, as it typically does not provide
any additional insights. Noteworthy, in other models of vertical differentiation, such as
Choudhary et al. (2005), the cost of quality investments is modelled as increased marginal
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costs, rather than as a fixed cost, which we do. Related to our case, it is nonetheless a
characteristic feature of several industries within the digital economy to have close to
negligible marginal costs (see e.g. Liu and Serfes, 2013). This is naturally dependent upon
which specific industry one considers.
The literature on the choice of pricing policy in spatial models is often concerned with
which parties gain and loose from different pricing policies. We have seen that in specific
monopoly situations, the firms might be able to extract all of the consumer surpluses
from purchasing the product. This might change drastically through the introduction of
only one rival in a spatial competition setting, as we have seen in the presentation of the
simplified Thisse-Vives model. The consumers in our model achieve a higher consumer
surplus compared to the presented simplified Thisse-Vives model as the firms invest in
quality and accelerate the competition for the consumers. This holds for both the one-sided
and the two-sided market, and by increasing the size of the advertisement market, the
consumer surplus increases further. With an adequately large advertisement market,
we have the result that the firms’ pricing policies will be decided by a mixed strategy.
Choosing to employ uniform prices lowers the accompanying quality investments by a




In this thesis, we aim to study the choice of pricing policy, employing either personalized
or uniform prices, in the digital economy. We review existing literature on the topic of
first-degree price discrimination and propose a theoretical model of spatial competition
in a two-sided market with quality investments. We focus on the digital economy as
the prevalence of big data allows firms in this industry to come much closer to apply
personalized pricing than before.
Seminal literature on the field of price discrimination, such as Thisse and Vives (1988),
suggests that a price discriminatory practice by firms is the optimal choice of pricing policy
in a duopoly competition with horizontal differentiation. However, in real-life, we have
seen proportionately less personalized pricing than what we should expect from the theory,
thereby constituting a uniform pricing puzzle. Various papers complement the early
literature on the field by making extensions and loosening up on the assumptions made by
Thisse and Vives (1988) and others. These papers provide rationals as to why firms might
opt for uniform prices rather than personalized pricing. Our model contributes to this
literature by studying a Hotelling model in which firms are enabled to invest in quality to
attract consumers, as well as including an advertisement market into the framework.
We study two iterations of our model. In the first iteration, we disregard the advertiser
market, thereby examining a one-sided model. In the second iteration, we include the
advertiser market. In the one-sided model, we find that the firms have a dominant strategy
of choosing to employ personalized prices. This complements the findings of Thisse and
Vives (1988). However, in the two-sided market our result contrasts these findings when
we extend the framework to include an adequately large advertisement market. We find
that the firms’ choice of pricing policy will be given by a mixed strategy, implying that
they will not always choose to price discriminate. An adequately large advertisement
market forces the firms to make high quality investments, for the reason of attracting
the increasingly valuable consumers, as they are crucial for the firms’ ability to earn
advertisement revenue. This competition for the consumers through investing in quality
is costly for the firms. In the model, we observe how the choice of pricing policy also can
be considered a choice of optimal quality investments by the firms. The different pricing
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policies affect a firm’s and its rival’s incentives to invest in quality differently. This way,
the firms will choose their pricing policy based on a mixed strategy, with the purpose of
weakening the competition in quality.
Few papers combine the choice of pricing policy and the presence of a two-sided market
in duopoly competition. We construct a model which serves as a simplified and general
framework to study this type of competition. Our findings contribute to help explain the
uniform pricing puzzle. More specifically, it highlights the role of two-sided markets in
the choice of pricing policy.
Naturally, many different aspects come into play when firms are choosing pricing policies
in the digital economy. Furthermore, the digital economy is still a fairly young industry
and is continuously developing. Consequently, there are several potential ways to expand
on this model and make various specifications.
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